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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
L

Did the trial court err in awarding Gallegos5 attorneys5 fees under
U.C.A., Section 78-27-56(1) where Lloyds prevailed in all or a
substantial part in the defense of Gallegos5 various claims? (Issue
preserved in the Record through Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs5 Motion for Attorney5s Fees and Costs, Rec. 326-331).
Standard of Review: The challenge of a conclusion of law underlying the

trial court's order is not accorded any deference, but is reviewed for correctness.
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review
for correctness." No deference is given to a trial courts' legal conclusions which are
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Wilcox
v. CSXCorp.. 2003 UT 21, 70 P.3d 85; Springville Citizens for a Better Community v.
CitvofSpringville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332; Warner v. DMG Color. Inc.. 2000 UT
102, If 21, 20 P.3d 868, 874 (quoting Softsolutions v. Brigham Young Univ.. 2000 UT 46,
112, 1 P.3d 1095).
II.

Did the trial court err in awarding Gallegos5 attorneys5 fees as
consequential damages to a trespass claim? (Issue preserved in the
Record through Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs5 Motion for
Attorney5s Fees and Costs, Rec. 326-331).
Standard of Review: The challenge of a conclusion of law underlying the

trial court's order is not accorded any deference, but is reviewed for correctness.
1

"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review
for correctness." No deference is given to a trial courts' legal conclusions which are
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). Wilcox
v. CSXCorp.. 2003 UT 21, 70 P.3d 85; Springville Citizens for a Better Community v.
CitvofSpringville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in
bad faith - Exceptions:
(1)
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2)
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).
STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal is from an award of attorneys fees to plaintiffs/appellees, Andrew and
Joan Gallegos (collectively "Gallegos") and against defendants/appellants, James and
Julie Lloyd ("Lloyds") following a two-day bench trial before Judge John Paul Kennedy
conducted on June 27-28,2006.
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The original Complaint, filed on August 6, 2004 by Gallegos against Lloyds and
others, was for trespass, negligence and quiet title based on the construction by Lloyds of
a residential building that encroached over and upon the adjoining un-occupied parcel
owned by Gallegos. (Rec. 1-9) The fact of the encroachment was not contested by Lloyds
in the litigation; rather, Lloyds contested the nature and amounts of damages allegedly
caused by the encroachment. (Gallegos Trial Brief, Rec. 200; Lloyds Trial Brief, Rec.
268) The encroachment is depicted on a plat created by Gallegos engineer and received
as Trial Ex. 9 (attached hereto as Addendum A).
After the completion of all discovery, approximately six weeks before the
scheduled trial, Gallegos moved the court for permission to amend their Complaint to
include a claim for punitive damages based upon an alleged wilfull diregard by Lloyds of
the property rights of Gallegos. (Rec. 131-140) At a hearing on May 31,2006, the trial
court granted Gallegos' Motion over the opposition of Lloyds and the other defendants,
and postponed the trial two weeks until June 28, 2006. (Rec. 205-206)
At the close of a two-day bench trial, Judge Kennedy awarded consequential
damages in favor of Gallegos in amounts significantly less than those requested by
Gallegos before and during trial. The trial court further refused to find that the conduct of
Lloyds rose to the level allowing him to grant punitive damages. Nevertheless, the court
did make a general award of attorneys fees in favor of Gallegos in the alternative form of
either additional consequential damages or attorneys fees recoverable for bad faith

3

defense under Utah Code § 78-27-56. (Transcript, Rec. 237 at page 7) The trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree included such award
and were entered in July 19, 2006. (Rec. 305-316; 317-319)
On July 19,2006, Gallegos filed a Motion for Attorneys Fee (Rec. 288-290) which
was opposed by a memorandum filed by Lloyds on July 27, 2006. (Rec. 326-331) The
Motion was heard by Judge Kennedy on November 2, 2006, and was granted with a
minor decrease in the amounts of fees and costs requested in the Supplemental Judgement
issued by Judge Kennedy on November 15, 2006. (Rec. 370-372)
This appeal is from the awards of attorneys fees granted in both the July 19, 2006
Judgment and Decree and the November 15, 2006 Supplemental Judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred When it Awarded Gallegos Attorney Fees as
Consequential Damages for its Trespass Claim.

The proper measure of damages under a trespass claim is "the diminished market
value of the property plus consequential losses to the use of the land or from discomfort
or annoyance" to the owner of the property. Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil
Company, 972 P2d 1238, 1246 (Utah 1998). The parties have yet discovered no case,
Utah or otherwise, in which attorneys fees were awarded as consequential damages
resultant from a permanent trespass similar to the present case.
In Utah and virtually every other state, "attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless
provided for by statute or by contract." B & R Supply Company v. Bringhurst 503 P.2d
4
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1216, 1217 (Utah 1972); accord, 22 Am. Jur. 2nd § 430 at 483. The reasons for the
general acceptance of this "American Rule" is that "since litigation is at best uncertain,
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting an action to vindicate their rights if
the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel." Fleishmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Similarly, a trial court
cannot award attorney's fees to a prevailing party as the consequential damages of a tort
"because [legal fees] are not the legitimate consequence of the tort

" Taxpayers for

Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy Dist. 739 F.2d
1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1984).
The trial court clearly erred as a matter of law in awarding Gallegos their
attorney's fees as consequential damages. Any holding to the contrary "would constitute a
substantial abridgment of the American rule, to which Utah courts have [until now]
demonstrated strong allegiance." Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean. 213 F.3d
1301, 1317 (10* Cir. 2000).
II.

The Trial Court Erred when it Concluded that the Lloyds' Defenses to
the Gallegos' Claim for Damages Were Without Merit and in Bad
Faith.

Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code allows a court to award reasonable attorney's
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines "that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought in good faith." Very early in the litigation discovery

5
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proceedings, Lloyds discovered and acknowledged that a trespass had occurred. No
contest or affirmative defense was ever made by Lloyds to that assertion. On May 31,
2006, four weeks before trial, Judge Kennedy granted Gallegos' Motion to Amend
Complaint and assert a claim for punitive damages. The entire litigation was directed to
the appropriate measure of damages to be paid to Gallegos as caused by said trespass and
the propriety of the claim for punitive damages.
At the close of trial, the Court (1) found total damages in the amount of
$72,053.31 - an amount significantly reduced from the amount plead in Gallegos'
Amended Complaint and Trial Brief- and (2) declared that it "could not find by clear and
convincing evidence that Lloyds had acted willfully, maliciously, or in an intentionally
fraudulent manner, or with a knowing and reckless disregard for the rights of others."
An asserted claim or defense cannot be meritless or "frivolous" if, after asserting that
claim or defense, the party prevails, even partially. Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams.
2005 UT App. at % 19, 122 P.3d at 149.
A court "shall award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). Thus, according to the plain
language of the statute, the bad faith requirement is linked to the phrase "action or
defense" by the conjunction "and," thereby indicating the Legislature's intent to limit
instances of bad faith to conduct linked to an "action or defense." The 10th Circuit Court

6
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On August 6, 2004, Gallegos filed the Complaint commencing this action. (Rec. 19) Gallegos thereafter purchased another Lot elsewhere in the general area upon which
their home plans for 102 would not work, obtained new plans and built a new home.
Gallegos' abandonment of Lot 102 and the plans for a home to be built thereon eventually
resulted in damage to the Gallegos in the form of wasted architectural fees and storage
costs (for the delay in construction). (Gallegos Trial Brief, Rec. 201)
Lloyds did not contest the existence of the physical encroachment of their
residence upon the Gallegos' property or the fact that such encroachment constituted a
trespass. (Rec. 200, 268) The only issues which were disputed by the parties throughout
the pre-trial litigation (up to May 31, 2006), were related to the nature and extent of the
damages incurred by Gallegos as a result of Lloyds' encroachment (Rec. 200, 268) In
addition to the architectural fees and storage costs described above, the parties disagreed
as to the amount of property that would be required to be severed from the Gallegos
parcel an conveyed to Lloyds in order to maximize the value of the Gallegos parcel given
the setback requirements. The damages therefore included issues as to, the fair market
value of the property to be severed and conveyed, the taxes that Gallegos had been pying
thereupon, and an asserted loss of scenic view suffered by Gallegos for the remainder of
the Gallegos parcel. (Rec. 268)
On May 2, 2006 - 6 weeks before the scheduled bench trial - Gallegos moved the
court for permission to amend the Complaint to add an additional claim for punitive
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slightly reduced the award, but reaffirmed its basis and the remainder in the Supplemental
Judgment dated November 15, 2006. (Rec. 370-372)
Lloyds have filed this appeal from the awards of attorneys fees granted by Judge
Kennedy in both the July 19, 2007 Judgment and Decree, and the November 15, 2006
Supplemental Judgment. (Rec. 386-388)
ARGUMENT
On July 19, 2006 the trial court entered judgment against Lloyds and generally
awarded Gallegos damages for the Lloyds' trespass on to the Gallegos' property. The trial
court also awarded Gallegos their attorney fees either as consequential damages of the
Lloyds' tort; or, in the alternative, because Lloyds' trespass was found to have been in
bad faith, and Lloyds' defenses to the Gallegos' claims were found to be without merit
and asserted in bad faith. There was no contract between the parties that contained any
agreement to pay attorney fees and the dispute did not involve any breach of contract
claims. Moreover, Lloyds did not contest the fact of the actual trespass, but disputed only
the nature and amount of damages claimed by Gallegos. Consequently, Lloyds' appeal is
directed only to the trial court's award of attorney fees.
The trial court held that Gallegos were entitled to attorney fees because either the
fees were part of the consequential damages the Gallegos suffered from the Lloyds'
trespass; (Findings f 13, at 10, Rec. 314) or, recoverable under Utah Code § 78-27-56
because Lloyds' defenses to Gallegos' claims were found to be without merit and in bad
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T an noyance to the
• d OL attorneys fees as

consequential damages in the Walker case or any other Utah reported tort action that
either Gallegos or Lloyds have been able to discover.
Gallegos did not include as their prayer for damages in either their Complaint
(Rec. 1-7) or Amended Complaint (Rec. 210-217) a claim for attorneys fees. Gallegos'
Trial Brief did contain a itemized schedule of consequential damages requested, with no
mention of attorney's fees. (Rec. 200) In concluding their Trial Brief, (Rec. 203)
Gallegos pray for relief to the trial court on the following particulars:
As a result, [Gallegos] incurred architectural fees, storage charges for
family heirlooms and furniture and have lost the property, the view and
have paid taxes on property they can't occupy. These are all legitimate
damageswhich will be proven and which should be recoverable in this
case.
In their Supplemental Trial Brief (Rec. 251-258) submitted following an eleventh-hour
Order by the trial court allowing Gallegos to amend their Complaint to include a cause
for punitive damages, Gallegos still failed to request any award of attorneys fees. At no
time during the trial did Gallegos assert that attorneys fees was an element of
consequential damages recoverable under their trespass claim. Only at the end of the
announcement by the Court of his ruling at the end of the trial, did Gallegos even attempt
to support any such award outside of their unsuccessful prayer for punitive damages.
(Transcript of Hearing of June 28, 2006, Rec. 397, at page 7, lines 1-19) Even there the
support proposed by Gallegos was directed to an award pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2756, which will be discussed in the next subsequent section.
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"It is well established in our ., v „.,
provided for by statute o

• * "

't\ cannot be recovered unless

- x R Suppl> Company v. Bringhurst. :M
.ccord, 21 Am. Jur. 2jld § 430 at 4N * i ^ >UPK

1

•*•.: '

• .va&

-••*'-.iponavoiiuaci There were no contractual attorr*^ • : -*•< provisions stipulated

between the parties. If there is a legitimate liasis lor the trial court's award of attorney
fees, it cannot be on ihc basis ul consequential damages. Utah adheres to that wellesuoLMi- :

> the United States, known as " the America.. . .

cannot be recovered by a prevailing partv ui;-.e» J -

torneyfees

>ntract authorizes such an

award . . .." Stewart v. Utan ruoiit- Set vice Commission. 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah . *N : h
accord Morganroth & Muruanruth - . DeLorean, 21 > F "rd 13^

;

(appivmg L 'ttih I\I\VL As recognized by the United States Supreme (Viirl, the reasons for
the general acceptance of the "America;; K.:C
one should no- u e penalizes
poor mign, .

•

r

•*

nation is at best uncertain,

lending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and. that the

-aeed from instituting an action to vindicate iheir n:.»hl\ if

tin- pc -:' *'T • KIWI included the fees of their opponents' omnscl.1' rieishmann
Distilling Corp, v. Maier Brewing Co., 3X6 IJ S /1 I 718 (1967).
An equally well-esldhhslu-d, •-*•' important, corollary to that rule i>;;;... .
court cannot award attorney's fees to a prevailing party as uw ^ n - ^
tort "because [legal fees] are not the legitimate . ;*•>.; -,*

- -.

'-:< iuii . . . .

i manes of a
... pavers

for Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Amma:^L.a :-'iata Water Conservancy Dlst.. n7- - - , Jd
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1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1984); accord Insuranshares Corp. v. N. Fiscal Corp.. 42 F. Supp.
126, 129 (E.D. Penn. 1941); Winkler et al. v. Roeder. 37 N.W. 607, 608 (Neb. 1888).
This rule has been consistently applied to trespass and nuisance cases. See, e.g., Wilen v.
Falkenstein. 191 S.W.2d 791, 804^-05 (Tex. Civ. App. 2006); Griffin et al. v. Lamberjack.
644 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (Ohio App. 1996); Harrison v. Textron. Inc.. 328 N.E.2d 838, 846
(Mass. 1975); Falk v. Waterman. 49 Cal. 224, 225; 1874 WL 1489.
There are at least two exceptions to this established rule. In adopting Utah Code
§ 78-18-1, Utah codified the common law exception allowing courts to award attorney
fees as consequential damages when punitive damages are also awarded. The clear
purpose of this statutory exception is to punish a party whose malicious conduct required
the prevailing party to bring a suit. But, where there is no finding of conduct sufficient to
support the award of punitive damages, there can be no award of attorney fees. In Debry
& Hilton Travel Services. Inc. v. Capitol International Airways. Inc.. 583 P.2d 1181, 1185
(Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that where there was no contractual attorney's
fee provision and where the asserted prayer for punitive damages was denied by the court,
no attorneys fees would be awarded. See also Dahl v. Prince. 230 P. 2d 328 (Utah 1951).
Accordingly, this exception will not aid Gallegos in this matter because the trial court
expressly held that no punitive damages could be awarded to the Gallegos where the
Gallegos lacked the requisite "clear and convincing evidence that the actions and/or
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.omissions of the Lloyds were the result ol ^ I'Hul ;»• • < 1 nialicious . . . conduct[.]" (Rec.
3! 2. Finding or hu,, "
:,; i;.

•

s

Conclusion of Law f 16)

>h courts may also award attorney's fees as coiisctfuenf«;»! ilamages

• • *-!e natural consequence of one's [tortious conduct | is am iiher's involvement in a
dispute with a third party/' also known .^ HK; '"third-party tort rule." Broadwater v. Old
Republic Surety, 8.u *
to fee

* i ;- •; un 191*3; However, this rule J ^ O

.•/-«< • • 11' I 11 ic urred in recovering damages from the a c .-••:.:.

•*.

?-'• jj.se the fees requested by Gallegos are limited lit ilu i r incurred in asserting their
claims against Lloyds, this exception

- -plieable to this case.

Given the mappliciihitilv of both exceptions to the general rule (and ilu: Ln„k oi AIW
additional exception heretofore asserted by Gallegos), iiu; I.1 s,r! , . h,;ii , irat'h erred as a
matter of law in awarding Gallegos their attorney's io> »•• consequential damages. Any
holding to the contrary '"would i.misi ••' -

substantial abridgment of the American ru.c,

to winch Utah umrK have | until now] demonstrated strong allegiance." Moduli; win -A
Morganroth. 3 i3 13a at 13 1 ti.
The Trial Court Erred when it Concluded that the Lloyds' Defenses to
the Gallegos' Claim for Damages Were Without Merit and in Bad
Faith.
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code allows a coun .:• , <
•• : .. ... . i *:i*. aro^cVs
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines "Liu
was without merit and noi broughl in good faith
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n

*t

• u oi uetense k me auion

Gallegos originally brought their

action against Lloyds and others on claims of trespass and quiet title. At the time of their
receipt of service of the Complaint, Lloyds had not yet verified the actuality of the alleged
trespass. Very early in the litigation discovery proceedings, Lloyds did discover and
affirmatively admit to Gallegos that a trespass had occurred. (Gallegos Trial Brief at 3,
Rec. 200) No contest or affirmative defense was ever made by Lloyds to that assertion.
The entire pre-trial litigation was directed to the appropriate measure of damages to be
paid to Gallegos as caused by said trespass. On May 2, 2006, at the eleventh hour before
the trial then scheduled for June 13, 2006, Gallegos filed a motion to amend their
Complaint to quantify their damages in the amount of $127,999.36, and assert a new
additional claim for punitive damages. (Motion to Amend, Rec. 131-140) Although
contested by Defendants Lloyd, (Memorandum in Opposition, Rec. 155-160) said Motion
was granted. The trial was rescheduled for June 27, 2006. Lloyds answered the
Amended Complaint formally admitting the trespass. (Answer to Amended Complaint,
Rec. 261 at f 7) Substantial pretrial and trial time and energy was thereupon expended by
both parties to the issue of whether Lloyds had acted "in willful disregard of the property
rights of others." Additional witnesses were required and documents prepared.
At the close of trial, the Court made specific findings concerning the each of the
elements of damage claimed by Gallegos as well as the nature of Lloyds conduct which
caused said damages. The Court found total damages in the amount of $72,053.31.
(Judgment, Rec. 318 at f 1) Although in excess of the $10,000.00 amount acknowledged

16
487233.1

iii Lloyds' Trial Brief, (Rec. 269) the aw aided .miuiini was significantly reduced from the
amount plead m o^.eu* - ^ \ • v
eviaerv-.

;

imolaint and Trial Brief (Rec. 200) because of

' - • " md defense arguments made b> T -ryds at f ; .

.^?-

-

•' i of

• - iss^sed damages was a direct result of'the increased -i»/e * r ^hce oi prop^ny -o be
conveyed by Gallegos to Lloyds.. I In- < ourt further found that it could not find r- .^mi'xl r~nvi neing e* : ..
..-J

*

is had acted willfully, maliciously, or in an

• •• tV'Muttiieiu maimer, or with a knowing and iock.j^^ u >iv^

jifreis/* (Rec. _; i 2. Finding of Fm i * ; . .m-.. - •
The trial court's award

.3

; *•

:• *"*' rvjhts

fusion of Law ^| 16)

''. v- under Section ""8-27-56, should be

reversed because • i M • In il i i-mt misconstrued 'the statute when it concluded lluil Lloyds'
cieuv.-.-- -. ;-v i ;allei?os demand for damages were \\ L, ..
faith, under Section 78-27-56. \IK .;.,,.

..- • -

•

i sued in good
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:

J ,.

hat the Lloyds fully or substantially

* the trial eom. based its determination ti\„ . • .>

on Lloyds" pre-lingatlo': ci'-nduct rather m.;

; . * * • •

A,

Lloyds' Defenses Were Not Meritless Given the Trial Court's Dismissal
of the Claim for Fraud and Substantial Reduction of Gallegos5 Damage
Claims,

Lloyds' asserted defenses cannot be deemed meritless in light of the fact that the
trial court reduced the amount of actual damages claimed by Gallegos by more than forty
percent and completely dismissed the Gallegos' claim for punitive damages. Under the
provisions of section 78-27-56(1), a trial court cannot award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party unless the losing party's claims or defenses were "without merit." While
the question of bad faith may be a question of fact,"[w]hether a defense is without merit
is a question of law, which can be determined on appeal." Broadwater v. Old Republic
Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 534, n.3 (Utah 1993). A claim or defense is without merit if it is
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Warner v.
DMG Color. Inc., 2000 UT at f 22, 20 P.3d at 874 (quoting Cadv v. Johnson . 671 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis added). However, an asserted claim or defense cannot
be meritless or "frivolous" if, after asserting that claim or defense, the party prevails, even
partially. Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App. at f 19r 122 P.3d at 149.
Moreover, defenses asserted against a plaintiffs claim for damages are not frivolous if
there is a factual basis for the defense in the record. See kL at 534. Thus, the Lloyds'
defenses of Gallegos' claims for actual and punitive damages are not "without merit" for
two reasons: (1) the Lloyds' prevailed in whole or part on their defenses; and (2) those
defenses were based on facts in the record. Gallegos have not appealed either the
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dismissal of the punitive damage or the significant devaluation of their damage claim on
the trespass.
When a party asserts a defense and prevails - even if only partially - as a matter of
law the asserted defense cannot be considered frivolous. In Mi Vida Enterprises v. SteenAdams, 2005 UT at f 19, 122 P.3d at 149, this Court interpreted a rule from the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure that is very similar to the "without merit" provision of
section 78-27-56. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for the
award of attorney's fees if an appellate court determines that an appeal is frivolous. Utah
R. App. P. 33. Having prevailed in the trial court and on appeal, the prevailing party
requested fees under Rule 33. In construing that rule, this Court held that the prevailing
party was not entitled to fees because the losing party's appeal could not be considered
"frivolous" for purposes of Rule 33 in as much as that party had partially prevailed on
appeal.
Similarly, the trial court erred when it concluded that Lloyds' defenses were
without merit or were frivolous. Lloyds partially prevailed against the Gallegos' claim
for actual damages and completely prevailed against Gallegos' claim for punitive
damages. The following table compares the parties' competing pre-trial claims with the
actual award by the trial court:
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Damage Item

Gallegos' Claim1

Court Finding2

Lloyd Admission3

Value of Property

$3 3,224.00

$27,500.00

$4,607.00

Value of Lost View

$ 19,176.00

$0

$0

Architecture Fees

$65,971.65

$39,500.00

$5,000.00

Storage Fees

$6,816.00

$2,300.00

$0

Real Estate Taxes

$2,811.71

$2,753.31

$1,000.00

TOTAL

$127,999.36

$72,053.31

$10,607.00

Clearly, Lloyds' defenses were not without merit, as they were successful in (1) reducing
Plaintiffs' liquidated claims by 43%, and (2) eliminating entirely Plaintiffs' claim for
punitive damages. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rec. 305-316; (312, f 30
and 315, f 16)) "No award of punitive damages should be made in this matter." Thus,
according to the reasoning of Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen- Adams, 2005 UT App. at f
19, 122, P.3d at 149, by even partially prevailing against Gallegos5 actual damages claim,
and by completely prevailing against Gallegos' claim for punitive damages, a reversal of
the trial court's award of fees is required.

1

Data extracted from Amended Complaint (Rec. 137-1380) and Gallegos' Trial
Brief. (Rec. at 200)
2

Data extracted from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Rec. 311, ^| 26)

3

Data extracted from Lloyds' Trial Brief. (Rec. at 269)
20
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B.

The Trial Court's Award of Attorneys Fees Was Based Entirely On Its
Finding of Bad Faith in Lloyds' Pre-litigation Conduct

The trial court misconstrued section 78-27-56 to exclusively punish Lloyds' prelitigation conduct. Before a trial court can award the prevailing party attorney fees, that
court must find that the losing party acted in bad faith within the litigation, to wit: "not
brought or asserted in good faith." In determining whether a party acted in bad faith for
purposes of section 78-27-56, the statute limits the scope of relevant conduct to a party's
"action or defense." In other words, for purposes of section 78-27-56, when determining
whether a party acted in bad faith, the only relevant conduct for consideration is a party's
conduct during litigation. In Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, f 13, 122
P.3d 556, 560, the Utah Supreme Court refused to award attorney fees under section 7827-56 because the party lacked "the subjective intent to bring this action in bad faith"
(emphasis added). The Court in Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon. 2002 UT
99, f 29, 61 P.3d 1009, 1018 awarded fees under section 78-27-56 where plaintiff
"lacked an honest belief in the propriety of bringing a suit" (emphasis added). In Warner
v. DMG Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 102, at \ 23, the Court affirmed an award of attorneys fees
under section 78-27-56 because "plaintiff acted in bad faith in pursuing his action"
(emphasis added). In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the Court
similarly affirmed an award of attorneys fees under section 78-27-56 because plaintiffs
"pursued their claims" in bad faith (emphasis added). In the current matter, the trial court
made no findings as to the conduct of Lloyds within the litigation other than stating that it
21
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found Mr. Lloyd's testimony "not credible." (Finding |14 at Rec. 308-09, and f 29 at
Rec, 312) In virtually every litigation there will be a requirement that the court find one
version of the facts as given by one side more credible than the other. That finding has
never been held sufficient by itself to uphold an award of attorneys fees under Section 7827-56.
While there are no Utah cases that expressly hold that section 78-27-56 does not
permit a court to consider prelitigation conduct when determining whether a party acted
in bad faith, that is the directive of the statute's plain language and structure. Section 7827-56 provides that "the court shall award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). Thus, according to
the plain language of the statute, the bad faith requirement is linked to the phrase "action
or defense" by the conjunction "and," thereby indicating the Legislature's intent to limit
instances of bad faith to conduct linked to an "action or defense."
Moreover, taken structurally, section 78-27-56 indicates that the bad faith
provision is limited to instances of bad faith during litigation given that all terms
preceding the bad faith provision have already been interpreted to refer exclusively to
litigation. As construed in Chipman v. Miller. 943 P.2d 1158, 1161-62 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), the term "action or defense" is limited to instances where a party asserts a legal
action (whether a claim or a motion), or a defense to a legal action. Moreover, whether
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conduct is "without merit" (the statutory term immediately preceding the bad faith
provision), is traceable only to a party's legal action or defense, and not to prelitigation
conduct. Thus, to conclude that the determination of whether an action or defense was
"not brought or asserted in good faith" somehow extends to pre-litigation conduct despite the fact that all prior elements of the statute relate exclusively to conduct during
litigation - would belie the structure and meaning of the entire statute.
Consequently, the trial court misconstrued section 78-27-56 when it relied on the
Lloyds prelitigation conduct to find that Lloyds acted in bad faith. As stated in the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the sole basis for awarding the Gallegos
attorney fees was the Lloyds prelitigation conduct. The trial court decided to award the
Gallegos fees: because "the Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their
actions and ultimately took advantage of Plaintiffs 'property rights of which [the Lloyds]
knew or should have known" (Trial Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law f 29, at
8); "based on documentary evidence and witness testimony presented at trial," id. at f 13,
at 10. However, taking advantage of the Gallegos property rights (presumably through
trespass) is not conduct related to the litigation; and none of the documents or witnesses
presented at trial established in any way that the Lloyds acted in bad faith during the
litigation. Indeed, the sole purpose of the documentary evidence and witness testimony
introduced at trial was to prove that the Lloyds pre-litigation conduct was sufficiently
wanton and willful to warrant an award of punitive damages, not attorney fees. That fact
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is especially obvious given that the decision to award attorney fees to the Gallegos was
made after trial ended; and during the course of those proceedings, neither the Gallegos
nor the trial court established a single instance when the Lloyds acted in bad faith during
the litigation.
While at least one Utah appeals court has affirmed an award of attorneys fees
based on pre-litigation bad-faith conduct, it did so only in the area of contract. Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984)
The 10th Circuit Court in Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301,
1318 (200), while determining whether a federal trial court had the inherent authority to
award attorneys fees for bad-faith conduct, did declare that "Utah likely would agree with
the weight of federal authority" limiting its consideration of "bad faith" conduct within
the litigation, "rather than substantially abridge American Rule by permitting its courts to
award attorney's fees for bad conduct not related to the litigation process itself."
CONCLUSION
The trial court's award of attorney fees is not supportable by either of its twin
rationales, whether as consequential damages or under Utah Code § 78-27-56. First,
where there is no statute or contract providing otherwise, attorney fees cannot be party of
an award for consequential damages. Neither statute nor contract is available to the
Gallegos to make such a claim in this case. Second, as a matter of law, Utah Code § 7827-56 cannot provide a basis for the award of fees. Lloyds' defenses to the Gallegos
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action for actual and punitive damages were not without merit because the Lloyds fully or
partially prevailed on all of those defenses. Finally, the trial court misinterpreted the badfaith provision of Utah Code § 78-27-56 and relied almost entirely upon prelitigation
conduct, even though the statute's plain language indicates otherwise. Accordingly,
Lloyds respectfully request that the trial court's decision to award the Gallegos attorneys'
fees on both the Judgment and Decree and the Supplemental Judgment be reversed.
DATED: April 30, 2007

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

T. RICHARD DAVIS
Attorneys for Defendants
James and Julie Lloyd
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ADDENDUM "A"
Plat Map Showing Encroachment
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RULING ONLY
MOTION ON ATTORNEY'S FEES
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CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JUNE 28, 2006

2

JUDGE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

^PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY*

6

P R O C E E D I N G S

7

THE COURT: Well, I think as our discussion focused

8

here, the problem appears to be that no one seems to be able

9

to say how long the process of being able to get a building

10

permit would have taken.

11

were under some sort of unique family pressures that prompted

12

them to need to act.

13

lot and proceed with the house on that location, on Location

14

14, was a reasonable decision given the facts.

15

The testimony was that Gallegoses

I find that their decision to buy a new

I find also that Mr. Lloyd was certainly negligent

16

in going forward with the construction on his home in the

17

location in which it was ultimately situated which I find in

18

violation of the approved site plan.

19

I find that if the lot were, in fact, staked as it

20

was built, it was not reasonable for him to rely on that

21

staking.

22

that it was correct.

23

should have known that the house was in the wrong place but

24

he proceeded anyway.

25

There were too many other indications to indicate
I would find that he either knew or

I find that he - that motivations existed to build

1

MR. HUNT: Got a question, Your Honor.

The award of

2

attorney's fees and you're calling that consequential

3

damages, not either allowed by statute or by contract, but

4

just as consequential damages; is that what I understand?

5

THE COURT: Well, I guess I have two choices. I

6

guess I could find punitive, a need for punitive damages here

7

and award them in that context, or I could put them in as

8

consequential damages on the other hand and it would seem to

9

me to be, it would save further hearing on a punitive damage

10

award.

11

awarded punitive damages here, but I think consequential

12

damages are appropriate.

13

As I say, by the slimmest of margin, I have not

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, if I may speak to that. I

14

think also the Court has the latitude to find that the

15

position advanced by the Lloyds in defense of the client is

16

not credible and that gives the Court latitude under 78-27-

17

56.

18
19
20
21
22
23

THE COURT: Well, and I would - I would so find
that.

I think that that's - warrant that.
MR. HUNT: We can submit that by motion and

affidavit in dealing with the amount orTHE COURT: Again, have Mr. Davis look that over
carefully.

24

MR. HUNT: Sure.

25

THE COURT: Anything further?
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN
GALLEGOS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 040916534
Judge John Paul Kennedy
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD;
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE
HOME LOANS, INC., a New York corporation,
dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER; J.
SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee; and CAREY
JOHANSEN dba LAND DESIGN,
Defendants.
This matter came on regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court on June 2Th
and 28 th , 2006, with die Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding without a
jury. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, George A. Hunt and

Stephen T. Hester of Williams & Hunt. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd were present
and represented by their counsel, T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough.
Defendant Mountain America Federal Credit Union was present and represented by its
counsel William G. Wilson of Scalley & Reading, and Defendant Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel, Darren K. Nelson of Parr,
Waddoups, Brown & Gee. Witnesses were sworn and counsel elicited testimony from the
witnesses, presented documentary exhibits and argued their respective positions to the
Court. The parties then submitted the case for decision and the Court issued a ruling from
the bench at the close of trial. Consistent with that ruling and in support thereof, the Court
now enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiffs, Andrew and Joan Gailegos (the "Gallegos"5) are record owners

of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically described as
Lot 102 Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase i n , Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 102").
2.

Defendants James and Julie Lloyd (the "Lloyds") are the record owners and

residents of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically
described as Lot 106 Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V, commonly known as 5982
Pioneer Fork Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 106").
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3.

Defendant Mountain American Federal Credit Union ("Mountain America")

is a Utah non-profit corporation and a federally chartered credit union with its principal
place of business in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") is a

Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, Utah and is acting as
nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York corporation, dba America's
Wholesale Lender ("Countrywide35).
5.

Lots 102 and 106 share a common property line. The common property line

is situated on top of a ridge.
6.

In 1993, the Gallegos purchased Lot 102 of the Emigration Oaks

Subdivision, Phase III, in order to build their dream home sometime in the future.
7.

In June of 1996, Defendants James and Julie Lloyd purchased Lot 106 of the

Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V. The topography of Lot 106 was a slope elevating
from the east property line up to the west property line shared with Lot 102.
8.

In an effort to improve Lot 106, the Lloyds engaged the services of Mr.

James Carroll to provide architectural drawings of a home to be built on Lot 106.
9.

Mr. Carroll provided detailed drawings of the Lloyds future home, including

a site plan, to the Lloyds and submitted the drawings and site plan to Salt Lake County to
gain approval to begin construction on Lot 106 (the "Lot 106 Site Plan"). Mr. Carroll
3

denies inspecting the construction of the Lloyd Home to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, although he visited the property five or six times
during construction.
10.

No evidence was presented regarding whether Defendants Mountain America

and Countrywide (who hold deeds of trust against Lot 106) inspected the construction of
the Lloyd home to ensure compliance with the Lot 106 Site Plan, nor was any argument
made that they had a duty to do so.
11.

Salt Lake County approved the Lot 106 Site Plan in or about August 1996

and the Lloyds began construction of their home (the "Lloyd Home") immediately
thereafter.
12.

Mr. Lloyd acted as the general contractor overseeing the construction of the

Lloyd Home. Mrs. Lloyd assisted Mr. Lloyd in his duties as general contractor by
reviewing and paying invoices of subcontractors.
13.

The Lloyd Home was neither staked nor constructed according to the

requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. The Lloyd Home was staked on Let 106 in such a
way that a portion of the home was built upon, and in fact encroached upon, Lot 102.
14.

The Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact that the construction

of their home was not proceeding according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot 102, is not credible. Likewise, the
4

Lloyd's assertion that they relied upon other professionals to properly stake theire home or
notify them that their home was not located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not
credible.
15.

There were several physical markers required by the Lot 106 Site Plan which

never materialized during the construction of the Lloyd's home. These markers included:
1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home;
2) the presence of two large retaining walls on both the west and east side of the driveway;
and 3) an average grade on the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%. The
absence of these markers provided unmistakable notice to the Lloyd's that their home was
being constructed in the wrong location.
16.

The Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the construction of their

home as staked because the Lloyds knew, or should have known, that the staking and
subsequent construction of their home violated the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan.
17.

The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan to their

considerable advantage.
18.

Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements of the Lot 106 Site

Plan. This motive included: 1) avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an improved view with southern exposure;

5

and 3) constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the average 8.5% slope
contemplated by the Lot 106 Site Plan.
19.

In July 1997, the Lloyds finished construction of their home on Lot 106. As

a result of the Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the home encroached upon Lot 102, well
beyond the minimal set back and side yard requirements required by the Lot 106 Site Plan.
20.

In disregarding the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Lloyds

intended to build their home in such a way that resulted in the unlawful invasion of the
Gailegos' property.
21.

As a result of the Lloyds5 disregard for the requirements of the Lot 106 Site

Plan, the Lloyd Home is fifteen feet higher in elevation than contemplated by the Lot 106
Site Plan and sits laterally over forty feet west of its designated location.
22.

The ultimate siting of the Lloyd Home interfered with the Gailegos' view

from Lot 102.
23.

As a result of the Lloyds5 encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gailegos were

unable to build a home on Lot 102 pursuant to architectural designs they had previously
developed and purchased.
24.

As a further result of the Lloyds' encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gailegos

were unable to determine when they would be able to obtain a building permit for Lot 102
and commence construction. Due to the indeterminable delay in commencing construction
6

on Lot 102, the Gailegos purchased Lot 14 in Phase I of the Emigration Oaks Subdivision
and proceeded with a new home design.
25.

As a direct consequence of Mr. Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the Gailegos

incurred architectural and storage fees that they would not have otherwise incurred, and
paid taxes on property being occupied and utilized by the Lloyds.
26.

The amount of the damages suffered by the Gailegos as a direct consequence

of the trespass of the Lloyds, are as follows:
Architectural Fees
Taxes
Storage Fees

$39,500.00
2,753.31
2,300.00

Lost Property Value

27,500.00

TOTAL
27.

$72,053.31

The encroachment and damages for taxes will continue until the boundary

can be adjusted and approved by the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association and any
and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. The correct approach to
adjustment is the approach suggested by the Gailegos5 expert witness, Mr. Jerry Webber,
viz., transfer a 38 foot wide strip along Lot 102's eastern boundary to the Lloyds in
consideration of the $27,500 in damages noted in 11 25, above. Such adjustment will
require the services of a licensed surveyor and the Lloyds should pay all such costs, together
with any and all fees and other costs associated with adjusting the respective property

7

boundaries and obtaining approval from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association
and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters.
28.

Moving or demolishing the Lloyd home would involve economic waste and

therefore the boundary adjustment mechanism described above is the most equitable
method of resolving the encroachment.
29.

As a direct consequence of the actions and/or omissions of the Lloyds, the

Gallegos were required to obtain counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the
boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render Lot 102 usable and
marketable. The Lloyds initiated no action to address or resolve their trespass. In addition,
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of this action. In particular, the
Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately, took
advantage of Plaintiffs' property rights of which they knew or should have known. Their
defense to the Gallegos5 claims was without merit. The amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
incurred should be established by motion pursuant to Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
30.

The Court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the actions

and/or omissions of the Lloyds were the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward
the rights of the Gallegos.
8
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FROM THE foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter

jurisdiction over this action.
2.

Venue is properly laid in this District.

3.

The Gallegos were, at all relevant times, in actual possession of Lot 102.

4.

The Lloyds trespassed on to Lot 102 by causing their home to be built in

such a fashion and location that it encroaches on Lot 102.
5.

Acting as the general contractor in building his own home, Mr. Lloyd owed

the Gallegos a duty to situate the location of his home with reasonable care and to ensure
that his home was constructed according to the Lot 106 Site Plan.
6.

Mr. Lloyd breached that duty by staking the Lloyd Home in such a way as to

cause the home to be situated and constructed so that it encroached upon Lot 102.
7.

The Lloyd's knew or should have known that their home was not staked or

constructed according to the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan but proceeded with
construction anyway.
8.

It was foreseeable that, as a result of Mr. Lloyd's breach of his duty to

properly stake his home and ensure that it was constructed according to the requirements of
the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Gallegos would suffer damages.
9

9.

The Lloyd's actions and/or omissions caused the Gallegos to be damaged.

10.

Mr. Lloyd acted unreasonably in proceeding with construction of the Lloyd

Home in violation of the Lot 106 Site Plan.
11.

It was reasonable for the Gallegos to pursue the design and construction of a

new home on Lot 14 in the Emigration Oaks Subdivision as a result of the Lloyds5
encroachment on Lot 102.
12.

As a result of the Lloyds' encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos should

recover damages consisting of: 1) architectural fees in the amount of $39,500.00; 2) taxes
paid on Lot 102 in the amount of $2,753.31 and continuing until property boundary is redrawn; 3) storage fees of $2,300.00; and 4) diminution in value of Lot 102 in the amount
of $27,500.00.
13.

As a further result of the Lloyds' encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos

suffered consequential damages in the form of attorney's fees which should be recovered. In
addition, based on the documentary evidence and witness testimony presented at trial, the
Lloyds' defense of this action was without merit and not asserted in good faith.
Accordingly, attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. § 7827-56, the amount to be established by motion under Rules 54 and 73 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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14.

As a further result of the Lloyds3 encroachment on to Lot 102, the property

boundary between Lot 102 and Lot 106 must be re-drawn in accordance with die expert
report of Mr. Jerry Webber. The new property boundary should run parallel with the
existing property boundary and should include approximately 7,800 square feet of Lot 102.
In the event that the property added by the boundary adjustment contains any scrub oak,
the conveyance should provide a perpetual easement encompassing that scrub oak thereby
preventing its destruction and/or removal.
15.

The fees and costs associated with preparing the new property boundary and

obtaining approval of the new property boundary from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners
Association and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters, should be
paid by the Lloyds.
16.

No award of punitive damages should be made in this matter.

17.

Defendants Mountain America and Countrywide are not culpable in this

matter and are not responsible for any of the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Accordingly,
they should be dismissed from this action.
18.

The Court should retain jurisdiction over this matter until the property

boundary adjustment is completed and all costs and fees associated therewith have been paid
in fall.
19.

The Court should enter a Judgment and Decree consistent herewith.
11

DATED this JfL day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WILLIAM G. WILSON
(JVA
DARREN K. NELSON

129443.1
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF XJTAH

ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN
GALLEGOS,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 040916534
v.

Judge John Paul Kennedy
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD;
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE
HOME LOANS, INC., a New York corporation,
dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER; J.
SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee; and CAREY
JOHANSEN dba LAND DESIGN,
Defendants.
This matter came on regularly for trial bef(5re ^

above-entitled Court on June 27 th

and 28 th , 2006, with the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding without a
jury. Plaintiffs were present and represented by tfieir counsel, George A. Hunt and
Stephen T. Hester of Williams & Hunt. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd were present
JudCjiramt anri Decree (S)J

040

^16534

JD2Q434212
LLOYD,JAMES

"*~? \

W

T

and represented by their counsel, T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough.
Defendant Mountain America Federal Credit Union was present and represented by its
counsel William G. Wilson of Scalley & Reading and Defendant Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel, Darren K. Nelson of Parr,
Waddoups, Brown & Gee. Witnesses were sworn and counsel elicited testimony from the
witnesses, presented documentary exhibits and argued their respective positions to the
Court. The parties then submitted the case for decision and the Court issued a ruling from
the bench at the close of trial. Thereafter, this Court entered its formal Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Consistent with the foregoing, and good cause appearing
IT IS HEREBY O R D E R E D , ADJUDGED A N D DECREED that:
1.

Plaintiffs Andrew and Joan Gallegos have a money judgment in their favor

and against Defendants James and Julie Lloyd, and each of them, in the amount of
$72,053.31, together with costs of court and attorney's fees to be determined by the Court
pursuant to Rules 54 and 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

Defendants James and Julie Lloyd shall proceed forthwith to effect a

boundary adjustment between Lot 106, Phase V, Emigration Oaks Subdivision and Lot
102, Phase III, Emigration Oaks Subdivision, whereby a 38f strip of land running parallel
from the Eastern line of Lot 102 shall be surveyed, staked and conveyed by Plaintiffs to
Defendants James and Julie Lloyd, said conveyance to be made upon payment of the money
judgment set forth in 111, above. In the event that the property added by the boundary
adjustment contains any scrub oak, the conveyance shall provide a perpetual easement

encompassing that scrub oak thereby preventing its destruction and/or removal. Also,
Defendants James and Julie Lloyd shall pay all fees and costs associated with a) preparing
the new property boundary between Lots 102 and Lot 106, and b) obtaining approval of
the new property boundary from the Emigration Oaks Homeowner's Association as well as
any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters.
3.

The claims against Defendants Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and

Mountain America Credit Union are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
4.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter pending completion of the

boundary adjustment process set forth in If 2, above.
DATED this J ( f d a y of July, 2006.
BY THE COURT

/fOH>) PAUL KB^NEI^Y /
( Distri/t Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WILLIAM G. WILSON

DARREN K. NELSON
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GEORGE A. H U N T (1586)
STEPHEN T. HESTER (9981)
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Andrew and Joan Gallegos
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN
GALLEGOS,

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES & COSTS

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 040916534
Judge John Paul Kennedy
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD;
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, I N C , a Delaware
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE
HOME LOANS, INC, a New York
corporation, dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE
LENDER; J. SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee;
and CAREY JOHANSEN dba LAND
DESIGN,
Defendants.

The Motion of Plaintiffs for Attorneys Fees and Establishment of Costs in this
matter came on regularly for hearing before die above entided court on November 2,
Supplemental Judgment for Attorneys Fees & Costs @

040916534

JD20801003
LLOYD-JAMES

^11

2006 at 8:30 a.m., the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding. George A. Hunt of
Williams & Hunt appeared for Plaintiffs, and T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker &
McCullough appeared for Defendants James and Julie Lloyd. The Court, after having
reviewed the various Memoranda filed by the parties, and having heard argument of
counsel and having noted the absence of any opposing affidavits or Rule 59(e) or Rule
54(d)(2) motions from Defendants, and having fully considered the positions of the
parties, and finding the requested fees and costs to be reasonable in amount and necessarily
incurred, except as adjusted herein, and good cause appearing, NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the motion
of Plaintiffs shall be and is hereby granted and Plaintiffs shall have Supplemental
Judgement against Defendants James and Julie Lloyd, and each of them, in the following
amounts:
1.

Attorneys fees of $56,798.00, said amount representing a 10% discount to

the amount claimed and requested by Plaintiffs; and
2.

Costs of $ 9,398.17, said amount representing a discount of $1,398.16 from

the amount of costs claimed and requested by Plaintiffs, for a total aggregate Supplemental
Judgment amount of $66,196.17.
DATED this j (-> . day of November, 2006.
BY THE C O U R T /
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JOH^HVL/L KENNEDY
District! Court Judge
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Approved as to Form:
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

T. MCHA^UD DAVIS
Attorneys for Defendants
James & Julie Lloyd
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